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1. Introduction
Principals often lack the information or expertise needed to evaluate the performance
of their agents. A common response to this problem is to rely on a better informed party
for performance evaluation. For example, funding agencies ask a committee of referees
to assess which research projects should be funded. Within a firm, the CEO usually relies
on a mid-level supervisor to judge which of the subordinates should get a bonus.
If the preferences of the principal and the evaluator, henceforth called the reviewer,
are not aligned, this can lead to distorted evaluations. In particular, there is much ev-
idence that supervisors tend to be too lenient when judging the performance of their
subordinates.1 Anticipating leniency, the subordinates will exert less effort. We study
optimal contracts that take into account the reviewer’s incentives when reporting the
observed performance of the agents.2
We consider a particular way in which the reviewer’s preferences are not aligned with
the principal’s. While the reviewer takes into account the effect of his actions on the
principal’s payoff—maybe because he owns shares of the company, has career concerns,
or cares intrinsically—he also cares about the agents (with equal weight for each agent).
A reviewer who cares about the agents will be reluctant to hurt them even if they do not
exert sufficient effort. He may thus exhibit a leniency bias. In our model, exactly how
much the reviewer cares about the agents is private information of the reviewer. This
is again inspired by the empirical literature, which shows that the degree of leniency
varies and appears to depend on the supervisor’s personality and social ties between
the supervisor and the team.3
One could imagine that the principal tries to correct the leniency bias by paying
transfers to the reviewer conditional on the evaluation that he performs. Our paper be-
longs to a literature on mechanism design without money where conditional monetary
transfers (to the reviewer) are ruled out by assumption. The approach restricts the class
of mechanisms over which the principal optimizes, but we believe that the restriction
is very plausible in our setting of performance evaluation. A conditional transfer would
mean paying the reviewer more when he reports a more negative evaluation. This is
typically considered a conflict of interest and is either explicitly illegal or judged as re-
pugnant.4
1Bol (2011) cites studies documenting leniency bias going back to the 1920’s, while citations to similar
findings in the 1940’s can be found in Prendergast (1999). Berger et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence
of the leniency bias.
2We do not consider the problem of incentivizing the reviewer to exert costly effort in order to learn some
state of nature. This is an interesting but distinct incentive problem which is studied in Aghion and Tirole
(1997), Strausz (1997), Szalay (2005), Rahman (2012), Pei (2015), and Liu and Migrow (2019). We also do
not examine why the principal does not perform the task of the reviewer herself. We treat the existence
of the reviewer as given in the same way that we treat the existence of the agents as given. Furthermore,
Strausz (1997) shows that it can be optimal to delegate evaluation to a reviewer even when the principal
could monitor an agent herself.
3Bernardin et al. (2000) document that the degree of leniency bias in an experiment depends on person-
ality traits of the reviewer. Bol (2011) and Breuer et al. (2013) find evidence of leniency bias which depends
on the strength of the employee-manager relationship.
4In Prendergast and Topel (1996), both the principal and a reviewer receive a signal about a worker’s
effort. Their main result is that leniency need not be costly for the principal if she can charge the reviewer
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Our main result is that a contest among the agents is an optimal mechanism. That is,
the principal defines a set of prizes and the reviewer’s report only determines how these
prizes are allocated to the agents. The reviewer cannot influence the overall size or the
division of the agents’ compensation. This strongly limits the degree of leniency he can
exercise. In particular, some agents are always punished by being assigned a small prize,
which is crucial for the preservation of incentives. The downside of the contest mecha-
nism is that a small prize has to be assigned (at random) even when all agents provide
the sufficient level of effort. When the agents are risk-averse, this will be inefficient.
More formally, we solve a mechanism design problem where the principal commits
to a mapping from the reviewer’s report (about his type and the agents’ efforts) to the
payments of the agents. To understand why a contest is optimal, consider how these
payments can vary with the reviewer’s report. First, when there is uncertainty about the
reviewer’s type, the only incentive-compatible mechanisms are those where the total
sum of payments is independent of the reported effort profile, for each type of the re-
viewer. If this was not the case, a reviewer who cares sufficiently much about the agents
would distort his report to increase the payments to the agents, while a reviewer who
cares sufficiently much about the principal would distort his report to decrease these
payments. Then, since the sum of payments is independent of the reported effort pro-
file, varying this sum across different reviewer types also cannot be strictly profitable
for the principal.5 Consequently, the optimal mechanism must provide a “commitment
to pay” a fixed total amount of money to the agents.6 Second, the division of the fixed
amount of money between the agents can vary with the reviewer’s report only to a lim-
ited extent. If given the opportunity, a reviewer who cares about the agents would al-
ways prefer to distribute the payments equally among all the agents instead of inducing
effort-contingent payments. Thus the optimal mechanism must additionally provide a
“commitment to punish” shirking agents.7 A contest, which is a mechanism in which
for exercising leniency. In Giebe and Gürtler (2012), the principal offers a menu of contracts to screen
lenient and nonlenient reviewers. They show that if the nonlenient type is common enough, the optimal
solution can be to pay a flat wage to the reviewer, and rely on the nonlenient type for punishment of an
agent who shirks. The main difference between these papers and ours is that we consider multiple agents
and do not allow contracts which condition payment to the reviewer on the reported evaluation.
5Krähmer and Kovácˇ (2016) and Tanner (2013) obtain related no-screening results for delegation.
6The literature has observed previously that a commitment to pay can be important when the agents’
efforts are not verifiable. For instance, Malcomson (1984, 1986) argues that piece-rate contracts are not
credible because the principal would always claim low performance ex post in order to reduce payments.
Levin (2002) shows that a constant sum of payments arises in equilibrium of a repeated game, where the
principal’s wage promises have to be self-enforcing. A contest-type compensation structure arises in an
optimal equilibrium only if the agents are risk-neutral. Svensson (2003) notes that conditional foreign aid,
where countries are rewarded with aid for successful reforms, can be ineffective if the aid officer is lenient.
Instead of evaluating each country separately, he proposes that each aid officer should be given a fixed
budget and discretion in how to allocate the aid across a group of countries.
7The problem of committing to punishment is related to Konrad (2001) and Netzer and Scheuer (2010).
They study the problem of a planner who would like to implement redistribution after agents have chosen
their actions, the anticipation of which may destroy incentives to choose costly but socially desirable ac-
tions. In the context of optimal income taxation, Konrad (2001) shows that private information about labor
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the payments to the agents are always just permutations of a fixed profile of prizes, pro-
vides these two types of commitment and enables the principal to incentivize both the
reviewer and the agents in an optimal way.
Our second result characterizes the prize structure of an optimal contest. Given n
agents, an optimal contest will have n−1 equal positive prizes and one zero prize. Thus,
while the contest acts as a commitment to punish, the punishment is kept at the min-
imum required to incentivize effort. The mechanism allocates a zero prize to only one
agent, so that the optimal contest exhibits a “loser-takes-nothing” rather than a “winner-
takes-all” structure. In equilibrium, when all agents have provided sufficient effort, the
agent who receives the zero prize is determined randomly. Thus all agents are facing
the same risk. If agents are risk-averse, they respond to this risk by reducing the amount
of effort they are willing to exert. A corollary of this result is that the first-best is imple-
mentable if and only if the agents are risk-neutral.
Our third result shows that a familiar all-pay auction with a cap achieves the opti-
mum, and it does so in unique equilibrium. As in a standard all-pay auction with n− 1
identical prizes, the agent with the lowest effort receives the zero prize. Ties are broken
randomly. However, efforts are capped at the desired equilibrium level. This removes
the possibility for the agents to exert slightly more than the equilibrium effort in order
to guarantee themselves a positive prize with probability one. In addition to the all-pay
auction, it can be shown that the optimum can also be achieved with an imperfectly dis-
criminating contest, such as the well-known Tullock contest. Thus, the essential feature
of our main result is the fixed profile of prizes, and not the exact form of the contest
success function.
Our results are interesting for at least three reasons. First, contests are a commonly
used and often-studied incentive scheme, and much work has been devoted to their op-
timal design.8 There is, however, not much work on the more general question whether
and under which conditions contests are optimal in some class of mechanisms. In their
seminal paper, Lazear and Rosen (1981) compare piece-rate contracts and contests.
When agents are risk-neutral, both mechanisms can induce the first-best outcome. For
risk-averse agents, they show that either mechanism sometimes dominates the other,
but they do not establish results on unconstrained optimality. A defining feature of con-
tests is that the payoff of the agents depends on how well they perform relative to each
other. Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) use this fact to show that
contests can do better than individual contracts when agents are risk-averse and there is
a random common shock to their outputs. If the relationship between effort and output
is ambiguous and the agents are ambiguity-averse, Kellner (2015) shows that contests
can be optimal because they filter out the ambiguity. In our paper, contests provide a
productivity provides a commitment against excessive redistribution. In the context of insurance and la-
bor markets, Netzer and Scheuer (2010) show that adverse selection provides a commitment by generating
separating market equilibria.
8For instance, Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the design of prizes for
a given contest success function. Jia et al. (2013) survey papers that study the design of a contest success
function for given prizes.
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commitment for lenient reviewers to punish shirking agents. Contests are optimal be-
cause they incentivize the agents at least as efficiently as any other contract that can
provide such a commitment.
Second, the assumed absence of conditional monetary transfers to the reviewer re-
lates our approach to the literature on optimal delegation. In our model, the reviewer’s
report determines the agents’ compensation, and thus one can think of the reviewer as
choosing the agents’ compensation directly from a limited set of options that the prin-
cipal makes available. The literature on optimal delegation studies how such delegation
sets should be designed.9 In the existing delegation literature, the principal wants to
base her decision on some stochastic state of nature which is assumed to be exogenous
and observed by an expert. In our setting, the state of nature on which the expert has
private information (the performance of the agents) is endogenous and determined in
anticipation of the report that the expert will make. As a matter of fact, the goal of the
principal is exactly to incentivize the agents to exert effort. Thus we contribute to the
literature on optimal delegation by introducing an endogenous state of nature that is
affected by the mechanism. The most closely related paper from the delegation litera-
ture is Frankel (2014). Like in our paper, he considers a multidimensional problem with
uncertainty about the expert’s preferences. In contrast to our paper, he assumes that the
state of nature is exogenous. Another difference is that Frankel (2014) derives max–min
mechanisms, which are optimal for the worst possible realization of the expert’s bias,
while we are interested in mechanisms that maximize the principal’s expected payoff
given her beliefs about the expert’s type. Frankel (2014) shows that, when the set of pos-
sible preferences of the expert is rich enough, a ranking mechanism is max–min optimal.
When the multidimensional state of nature is an effort profile, like in our setting, this
ranking mechanism would correspond to a standard all-pay auction.10 Such an all-pay
auction without a cap is not optimal in our setting with endogenous efforts. However,
there is a range of different contests that are optimal. Furthermore, since the principal’s
payoff turns out to be independent of the reviewer’s type in these optimal contests, they
not only maximize expected payoffs but are also max–min optimal.
Third, our results have direct implications for the controversial debate over the use of
so-called “forced rankings,” a review system which was most famously used by General
Electric under Jack Welch during their fast growth in the 1980’s and 1990’s.11 Our contri-
bution to this discussion is (i) to show that forced rankings are optimal for motivating
effort under the assumptions of our model, (ii) to show how optimal forced rankings
should be constructed, and (iii) to show that some elements of forced rankings which
9See, for example, Holmström (1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Alonso and Matouschek
(2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Frankel (2014).
10See Charkraborty and Harbaugh (2007) for a model of multidimensional cheap talk in which ranking
statements are credible in equilibrium, and Siegel (2009) for a general treatment of contests with all-pay
structure.
11For example, see “‘Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970203363504577186970064375222), L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012,
and “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2013/
11/20/for-whom-the-bell-curve-tolls/?utm_term=.c09d9ad39dc8), J. McGregor, The Washington Post,
November 20, 2013.
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are usually criticized are actually necessary for incentivizing effort. In particular, forced
rankings are criticized for forcing managers to assign low rankings even when all workers
are performing well: “What happens if you’re working with a superstar team? You’ve just
forced a distribution that doesn’t exist. You create this stupid world where [great] peo-
ple are punished.”12 Our results show that, far from being stupid, not rewarding some
workers even when they perform well is necessary, since if the managers were given an
opportunity to reward all workers, they may use it irrespective of actual performance,
which would destroy the incentive effect of the evaluation system.
We make several simplifying assumptions in our model. The most important ones
are that the reviewer perfectly observes the efforts of the agents, that the reviewer has no
intrinsic motive to reward higher efforts and also does not exhibit favoritism toward any
agent, and that all agents have identical cost functions. In the conclusion, we will discuss
how these assumptions can be relaxed and to what extent our results are robust. On a
more general note, while our paper identifies a novel benefit of relative performance
evaluation, it abstracts away from some of its costs, namely collusion among the agents
and sabotage. While these costs of relative performance evaluation are not the focus of
the paper, we will return to them in the conclusion where a more substantive discussion
is provided.
2. The model
2.1 Environment
There is a set of agents I = {1     n} with n ≥ 2. Each agent i ∈ I chooses an effort level
ei ≥ 0 and obtains a monetary transfer ti ≥ 0. The agents have an outside option of zero.
The payoff of agent i is given by
πi(ei ti)= u(ti)− c(ei)
The utility function u : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, weakly con-
cave, and satisfies u(0) = 0. The cost function c : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly convex, and satisfies c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and limei→∞ c′(ei) = ∞. The
assumption of additive separability of transfers and efforts is standard in contract the-
ory, mechanism design, and contest theory. We will discuss the robustness of our results
with respect to nonseparable preferences in the conclusion.
Denote effort profiles by e= (e1     en) ∈ E and transfer profiles by t = (t1     tn) ∈
T . We assume that E =Rn+ and T = {t ∈Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 ti ≤ T¯ }, where T¯ > 0 can be arbitrarily
large. Our results hold no matter whether the budget T¯ is eventually binding or not.
There is a principal, whose payoff from an allocation (e t) is
πP(e t)= z(e)−
n∑
i=1
ti
12Quote of a management adviser in “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/on-leadership/wp/2013/11/20/for-whom-the-bell-curve-tolls/?utm_term=.c09d9ad39dc8), J.
McGregor, The Washington Post, November 20, 2013.
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where z : E → R+ is interpreted as the production function that converts efforts into
output. For clarity of exposition, we will focus only on the case where z(e)=∑ni=1 ei. Our
main results continue to hold if we assume more generally that z is symmetric, weakly
concave, and strictly increasing in each of its arguments.
Example. We will use a parameterized example to illustrate our results throughout the
paper. In this example, each of the n agents has the payoff function
πi(ei ti)= tαi − γeβi 
where 0< α≤ 1 parameterizes risk-aversion, β> 1 describes the degree of cost convex-
ity, and γ > 0 determines the relative weight of effort costs.13 We will always assume that
T¯ is large enough to be nonbinding in the example. The first-best effort level eFB is what
the principal would demand from each agent if she could perfectly control effort and
would only have to compensate the agent for his cost, thus paying tFB = u−1(c(eFB)). In
our example, maximization of e− u−1(c(e)) yields
eFB =
(
α
βγ1/α
) α
β−α
and tFB =
(
α
βγ1/β
) β
β−α

The principal’s first-best profit is n(eFB − tFB).
The effort profile of the agents is neither verifiable to outside parties (e.g., a court)
nor observable to the principal. The efforts can, however, be observed by a reviewer. The
payoff of the reviewer from an allocation (e t) is given by
πR(e t θ)= πP(e t)+ θ
n∑
i=1
πi(e t)
where θ is a parameter that captures how much the reviewer cares about the well-being
of the agents, and thus by how much the reviewer’s preferences are misaligned with
those of the principal. The parameter θ can be thought of as a fundamental prefer-
ence or as a reduced-form representation of concerns due to other interactions with the
agents. We assume that θ is private information of the reviewer, observable neither to
the principal nor to the agents. It is drawn according to a commonly known continuous
distribution with full support on 	 = [θ θ¯], where θ < θ¯. We describe this distribution
by an (absolutely continuous) probability measure τ over 	. Our results will be inde-
pendent of the shape of this distribution. In particular, τ could be arbitrarily close to a
probability measure with atoms. When discussing the intuition behind our results, such
as the issues arising due to a leniency bias, we implicitly assume that θ is positive, but
our results also hold when θ can take negative values.
13Since we assume α > 0, the example includes some but not all CRRA utility functions. This is because
we require u(0)= 0, which is not satisfied by all CRRA functions.
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2.2 Direct mechanisms
We solve a mechanism design problem without monetary transfers from the principal to
the reviewer.14 The timing is as follows. First, the principal designs a direct mechanism
(which is w.l.o.g. due to the revelation principle). Second, the agents choose their efforts
simultaneously. Third, the reviewer privately observes these efforts and his type and
makes a report.15
Formally, the principal commits to a direct mechanism  = (μeθ)(eθ)∈E×	, which
maps each possible report (eθ) ∈ E × 	 of the reviewer into a probability measure
μeθ ∈ T on the set of transfers to the agents. We will simply refer to such a mecha-
nism as a contract.16 Since the reviewer is always free to make any report that he prefers,
the following incentive-compatibility constraint makes sure that the reviewer has an in-
centive to report truthfully:
R
(
eμeθ θ
)≥R(eμe′θ′ θ) ∀(eθ) (e′ θ′) ∈ E ×	 (IC-R)
where
R
(
eμe
′θ′ θ
)= Eμe′θ′
[
πP(e t)+ θ
n∑
i=1
πi(ei ti)
]

We say that a contract  is credible if it satisfies (IC-R).
Given a credible contract, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously, anticipat-
ing that they will be rewarded according to the contractual specifications. Denote by
σi ∈ R+ agent i’s mixed strategy for his effort provision. We also write ei ∈ R+ for Dirac
measures that represent pure strategies. Strategy profiles are given by σ = (σ1    σn) ∈
(R+)n. We also use σ to denote the induced product measure in E. We say that a
contract  implements a strategy profile σ if it is credible and satisfies
i
(
(σiσ−i)
)≥i((σ ′i σ−i)) ∀σ ′i ∈ R+∀i ∈ I (IC-A)
14To be precise, we assume that the principal does not pay the reviewer conditional on the report that
the reviewer makes. The principal could pay a fixed fee. In addition, our model can be easily reformulated
to include payments to the reviewer based on the profitability of the firm, such as when the reviewer owns
shares or has career concerns that align his interests with the performance of the firm. Any such term in
the reviewer’s payoff function can be captured by πP and a normalization of θ. Another instrument that our
approach rules out is the possibility of direct communication between the principal and the agents.
15A different timing would be that the reviewer observes his type already before he interacts with the
agents and observes their efforts. In that case, the principal could design a menu of mechanisms from
which the reviewer selects before observing the agents’ efforts. Our results are robust to this different timing
provided that the reviewer’s selection is not observable to the agents. If it was observable, additional sig-
nalling issues would arise, because the agents may coordinate on different effort profiles contingent on the
reviewer’s observable action. We refrain from studying these issues here, but we remark that, even in that
case, the additional gain (if any) from a more complicated mechanism is limited if the agents’ risk-aversion
is moderate or the number of agents is large (see Section 3.2).
16We impose the following regularity condition on contracts: For each measurable set A⊆ T , μeθ(A) is
a measurable function of (eθ). This ensures that expected payoffs are well-defined.
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where
i(σ)= Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
u(ti)
]]]−Eσi[c(ei)]
Since a deviation to an effort of zero always guarantees each agent a payoff of at least
zero, the agents’ participation constraints can henceforth be ignored.
The principal maximizes her expected payoff by choosing a contract  to implement
some strategy profile σ . Formally, the principal’s problem is given by
max
(σ)
P(σ) s.t. (IC-R) (IC-A) (P)
where
P(σ)= Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
−Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]

A contract ∗ is optimal if there exists σ∗ such that (σ∗∗) solves (P).
Finally, we introduce a specific class of direct mechanisms that will be referred to
as contests. A contest is described by a fixed profile of prizes y = (y1     yn) ∈ T , some
of which could be zero, and a rule how these prizes are allocated to the n agents as a
function of their efforts. More formally, let P(y) denote the set of permutations of y.17
Then a contest Cy with prize profile y is a contract that satisfies (i) μeθ(P(y)) = 1 for
all (eθ) ∈ E × 	, and (ii) μeθ = μeθ′ for all θθ′ ∈ 	 and e ∈ E. Condition (i) states
that, for each possible report of the reviewer, the realized transfer profile will always
be a permutation of the same prize profile. Condition (ii) requires that the prizes are
allocated according to a (possibly probabilistic) contest success function that depends
on the agents’ efforts but not on the type of the reviewer. This formulation includes all
common contests, such as all-pay auctions and Tullock contests.
Note that every contest is credible. This is because, once the agents’ efforts are sunk,
any permutation of the prizes generates the same payoff for the principal and the same
sum of utilities for the agents. Formally, in any contest Cy we obtain that
R
(
eμe
′θ′ θ
)= n∑
i=1
ei −
n∑
i=1
yi + θ
(
n∑
i=1
u(yi)−
n∑
i=1
c(ei)
)

which is independent of (e′ θ′). However, the set of credible contracts is substantially
larger than the set of contests. For instance, it is possible to select from a much larger
set of transfer profiles, not just permutations of a given prize profile, and still keep both
the expected sum of transfers and the expected sum of the agents’ utilities constant. Fur-
thermore, credible contracts do not have to be independent of θ but can screen different
reviewer types.
17Profile t is a permutation of y if there exists a bijective mapping s : I → I such that ti = ys(i) ∀i ∈ I.
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3. Optimal contracts
3.1 The optimality of contests
To illustrate the key incentive problem in our model, suppose first that the preference
parameter θ was known to the principal and the agents. The following example shows
that, in this case, there may exist a credible contract which is not a contest but which
implements the first-best effort levels and extracts the entire surplus.
Example. Consider our previous example for the special case of n = 2. Suppose the
reviewer’s type was common knowledge. First, assume θ= 0 so that there is also no mis-
alignment of preferences between the principal and the reviewer. Consider a contract
FB where, if both agents exert eFB, each of them is paid tFB. If one agent deviates, that
agent is paid 0 while the nondeviating agent is paid 2tFB. In case both agents deviate,
they are again each paid tFB. It is easy to verify that this contract is credible, because
the sum of transfers is constant across (tFB tFB), (2tFB0), and (02tFB), which makes
the reviewer indifferent between these transfer profiles. It is also easy to verify that this
contract implements (eFB eFB), because both agents receive a payoff of zero in equi-
librium and a payoff of at most zero after any unilateral deviation. Thus the first-best
is achievable. Observe that FB is not a contest, because the three transfer profiles are
not all permutations of each other. We will show in Section 3.2 that the first-best is not
achievable by a contest if the agents are risk-averse. Hence, FB performs strictly better
than any contest in this example. This shows that nonverifiability of effort alone does
not make contests optimal.18
Now assume that θ > 0 and adjust the contract FB as follows. The payment 2tFB to a
nondeviating agent is replaced by some tnd, while everything else is kept unchanged. If
tnd is chosen such that the reviewer is indifferent between the transfer profiles (tFB tFB),
(tnd0) and (0 tnd), credibility is restored and the first-best can be implemented. For in-
stance, with α= 1/2, β= 2, and γ = 1 we have eFB ≈ 063 and tFB ≈ 016. For a reviewer of
known type θ= 3, we would then obtain tnd ≈ 115.19 This shows that the misalignment
of preferences per se does not make contests optimal either.
The contracts described in the example no longer work if θ is the reviewer’s private
information. Just consider the optimal contract for type θ = 0. Any reviewer with type
θ′ > 0 will strictly prefer to report in a way that induces the transfers (tFB tFB), no mat-
ter what efforts the agents have exerted. This is the leniency bias. The crucial point is
that only the reviewer of type θ = 0 will follow the contract. All other reviewer types,
no matter how close they are to type θ = 0, will not take the efforts of the agents into
18This argument is similar to the optimality of bonus pools in Rajan and Reichelstein (2006). It is also
related to MacLeod (2003), who considers transfers to a third party in order to keep the principal’s expen-
diture constant. Fuchs (2015) shows that there is an additional commitment advantage of bonus payment
schemes—they allow the manager to credibly reveal the fit between the worker and the firm.
19The indifference condition is −2tFB +θ2u(tFB)= −tnd +θu(tnd). Given our parameters, it has a second
solution tnd ≈ 372, which would work as well. Note that the indifference condition is not guaranteed to
have a solution for all parameter values, so our simple construction of a first-best contract does not work
for all values of θ > 0.
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account when deciding on their optimal report. Thus, the contracts outlined in the ex-
ample above are knife-edge cases. They fail as soon as the reviewer’s type is drawn from
an arbitrary continuous distribution. This creates a stark contrast between the case of
perfect information and the case of arbitrarily small uncertainty about the reviewer’s
type.
Our first main result shows that, despite the fact that the set of possible contracts is
very large, optimal contracts with uncertainty about θ take a very simple form.
Theorem 1. The set of optimal contracts contains a contest.
We prove Theorem 1 by a series of six lemmas. Since we have shown that the prin-
cipal may be able to implement the first-best if she knew the reviewer’s private type
θ, it would seem reasonable to expect that the principal could benefit from screening
these types. In fact, it is not difficult to construct contracts that screen the reviewer’s
type, by varying the sum of transfers and the sum of utilities given to the agents. How-
ever, Lemmas 1–3 below demonstrate that it is not possible for the principal to bene-
fit from screening. Lemmas 4 and 5 then show that the principal cannot benefit from
implementing mixed or asymmetric effort profiles. Finally, Lemma 6 shows that using
contests is without loss of optimality.
To begin with, we fix an arbitrary contract = (μeθ)(eθ)∈E×	 and denote
St(eθ)= Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
 Su(eθ)= Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
and S(eθ)= −St(eθ)+ θSu(eθ). We can then write the credibility constraint (IC-R) as
−St(eθ)+ θSu(eθ)≥ −St
(
e′ θ′
)+ θSu(e′ θ′) ∀(eθ) (e′ θ′) ∈E ×	
Our first lemma provides a characterization of this multidimensional constraint.
Lemma 1. A contract  is credible if and only if the conditions (i)–(iii) hold:
(i) ∀θ ∈	, S(eθ)= S(e′ θ) ∀e e′ ∈ E.
(ii) ∀e ∈E, Su(eθ) is nondecreasing in θ.
(iii) ∀e ∈E, S(eθ)= S(eθ)+ ∫ θθ Su(e s)ds ∀θ ∈	.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) are familiar from the mechanism design literature. They
have to hold separately for each fixed effort profile e. Condition (i) concerns the ef-
fort dimension and shows that the payoff of any reviewer has to be constant for any
reported e.
Observe that combining (i) and (iii) implies
∫ θ
θ Su(e s)ds =
∫ θ
θ Su(e
′ s)ds for all e,
e′ and θ. This means that not only S(eθ) but also its constituent Su(eθ) has to be
constant across different effort profiles e (for almost every θ). But then the other con-
stituent St(eθ) cannot vary with e either. The next lemma summarizes this important
implication of the credibility constraint.
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Lemma 2. A contract  is credible only if there exists a pair of functions x : 	 → R+ and
xˆ :	→R+ such that, ∀e ∈E,
St(eθ)= x(θ) Su(eθ)= xˆ(θ)
for almost all θ ∈	.
We now show that there is no gain for the principal from screening the reviewer’s
private type by using a complex contract where μeθ varies with θ.
Lemma 3. For every contract that implements a strategy profileσ , there exists a contract
ˆ that also implementsσ , yields the same expected payoff to the principal, and, ∀θθ′ ∈	,
satisfies μˆeθ = μˆeθ′ ∀e ∈E.
The proof of the lemma is constructive and shows how the contract ˆ without
screening can be obtained from an arbitrary credible contract . Additional intuition
can be obtained by looking again at the example from the beginning of this section.
There the lenient reviewer of type θ = 3 is compensated for revealing a shirking agent
by a larger sum of transfers that he can allocate to the nonshirking agents off the equi-
librium path. However, by Lemma 2, the sum of transfers St(eθ) cannot vary with the
reported effort profile e, so the principal cannot just compensate the reviewer off the
equilibrium path. Screening would require that the expected sum of transfers also varies
with type θ on the equilibrium path, which is not beneficial to the principal.
Given this result, we from now on focus without loss of generality on contracts where
the agents’ transfers depend on their efforts only, which we write as  = (μe)e∈E . The
next lemma shows that the principal does not benefit from implementing mixed strate-
gies.
Lemma 4. For every contract that implements a strategy profileσ , there exists a contract
ˆ that implements the pure-strategy profile e¯= (e¯1     e¯n), where e¯i = Eσi [ei] ∀i ∈ I, and
yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
The intuition behind this result is simple: any randomness in transfers that is
achieved by mixed strategies can equivalently be generated by the contract. On the other
hand, since c is convex, the agents benefit from exerting the average effort e¯i instead of
σi, while the principal is indifferent as to whether she obtains the efforts in expectation
or deterministically.
The next lemma states that it is without loss to restrict attention to the implementa-
tion of symmetric effort profiles.
Lemma 5. For every contract  that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1     e¯n),
there exists a contract ˆ that implements the symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ =
(eˆ1     eˆn), where eˆ1 = · · · = eˆn = 1n
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and yields the same expected payoff to the
principal.
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The next lemma completes the proof of Theorem 1 by demonstrating that the prin-
cipal can achieve the same payoff with a contest as with any nonscreening contract that
implements a symmetric pure-strategy effort profile. Thus, the principal can obtain her
maximal payoff with a contest.20
Lemma 6. For every contract  that implements a symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ, there
exists a contest Cy that also implements eˆ and yields the same expected payoff to the prin-
cipal.
To prove this lemma, we construct a contest which implements the effort profile eˆ.
This contest features n− 1 identical prizes and one prize that is smaller. The small prize
is used to punish agents who deviate in either direction from eˆ. In equilibrium, when
the effort profile eˆ is realized, the small prize is allocated randomly among the agents.
As we will show in the next section, this particular prize structure is a general feature of
optimal contests, while the specific (nonmonotonic) allocation rule is not required to
achieve the optimum.
3.2 Optimal contests
From the previous section, we know that the principal can restrict attention to contests
when designing an optimal contract. In this section, we characterize general features of
all optimal contests. When describing a contest Cy , in the following we always assume
w.l.o.g. that the prize profile y is ordered such that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn.
Theorem 2. A contest is optimal if and only if conditions (i) and (ii) hold:
(i) The prizes satisfy yn = 0 and ∑nk=1 yk = x∗, with x∗ =min{x¯ T¯ } and x¯ given by
u′
(
x¯
n− 1
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x¯
n− 1
)))

If the agents are risk-averse, then the prize profile is unique and given by
y = (x∗/(n− 1)     x∗/(n− 1)0)
(ii) The contest implements (e∗     e∗), where e∗ is given by
e∗ = c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
))

Condition (i) in the theorem shows that the lowest prize will be zero in any optimal
contest. This is not obvious, since the agents can be risk-averse and in equilibrium all
agents face the risk of receiving the zero prize. The intuition is that in equilibrium an
agent receives the zero prize with probability 1/n, while a shirking agent would receive
20To be exact, Theorem 1 follows only after it has been shown that problem (P) has a solution, so that an
optimal contract exists. This will be shown in the proof of Theorem 2 in the next section.
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the zero prize with strictly larger probability (possibly one). Thus, any increase in yn de-
creases the difference between the equilibrium and the deviation payoffs and, therefore,
decreases the amount of effort that can be demanded in equilibrium. When the agents
are risk-averse, the optimal prize profile will feature n− 1 identical positive prizes in ad-
dition to the zero prize, which keeps the risk imposed on the agents in equilibrium at a
minimum. This prize structure is not novel, and its good incentive properties have been
observed before in different settings.21 We also characterize the optimal total prize sum
x∗, which is given by the point x¯ where marginal cost and benefit of inducing effort are
equalized, or by the exogenous budget T¯ whenever it is sufficiently tight.
Condition (ii) in the theorem shows that every optimal contest extracts the entire
surplus from the agents, because it implements a symmetric pure-strategy effort profile
such that each agent’s equilibrium payoff is zero. This condition puts limits on the set of
possible contest success functions which can be used to achieve the optimum. We will
explore these limits in Section 3.3.
Having characterized the optimal contests, we turn to the question of efficiency loss.
Corollary 1. If the agents are risk-neutral, the principal can achieve the first-best. If the
agents are risk-averse, the principal cannot achieve the first-best.
The efficiency loss is driven entirely by risk-aversion of the agents. The loss is a di-
rect consequence of the necessity to assign a prize of zero. Since the principal has to
commit to the low prize, it must be delivered even in equilibrium. Risk-averse agents
have to be compensated for this, which increases the cost of inducing effort. Hence, the
commitment problem prevents the principal from achieving the first-best. However,
the loss will be small if the agents are only mildly risk-averse, as the following example
illustrates.
Example. Consider again our example for n= 2. Applying the results from Theorem 2,
it can be shown that e∗ = 2(α−1)/(β−α)eFB and x∗ = 2(β−1)/(β−α)tFB holds in any optimal
contest. The ratio of second-best to first-best profits of the principal is therefore
R= 2e
∗ − x∗
2eFB − 2tFB =
2
β−1
β−α
(
eFB − tFB)
2
(
eFB − tFB) = 2
α−1
β−α 
This ratio is increasing in α, with R → 1 in the limit as α → 1, so second-best profits
approach first-best profits when the agents’ risk-aversion vanishes.
21For example, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show that a single negative prize (a penalty) provides better
incentives than a single positive prize. Glazer and Hassin (1988) show that the optimal way to split a budget
into prizes is to have n − 1 positive prizes and one prize equal to zero. The reason for optimality of this
prize profile is the same as in our model, namely the assumption that agents are risk-averse. Fang et al.
(forthcoming) obtain a similar result for risk-neutral agents and convex effort costs. It is difficult to directly
compare these papers to ours, since they consider only one specific contest success function that is taken
as given. The contest success function that is optimal in our setting is different from those ones studied in
these papers (see Subsection 3.3).
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The loss will also be small if there are many agents, because the probability of not re-
ceiving any of the n−1 identical prizes is 1/n in equilibrium and vanishes as the number
of agents grows. This has been observed before by Glazer and Hassin (1988), and similar
arguments can be found in Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). In
our setting, these arguments imply that using mechanisms without conditional mone-
tary transfers to the reviewer comes with little loss compared to an unconstrained mech-
anism design approach if the agents’ risk-aversion is small or if the number of agents is
large.
3.3 Unique implementation
We say that a contract  uniquely implements some pure-strategy effort profile e if it
(i) implements e and (ii) does not implement any other (possibly mixed) strategy profile
σ = e. The next theorem states that the second-best effort profile from Theorem 2 can
be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap.22
An all-pay auction is one of the canonical contest types (see Konrad 2009, Chap-
ter 2.1). It is perfectly discriminating, in the sense that the agent with the highest effort
wins the highest prize with probability one, the agent with the second highest effort wins
the second prize, and so on. Ties are broken randomly. A cap is a maximum admissi-
ble effort level (see Che and Gale 1998). In our setting, a cap could be implemented in
two different ways. First, the contract could simply not differentiate effort levels at or
above the cap, i.e., an agent who exerts effort exactly at the cap and an agent who exerts
effort above the cap are treated the same and have the same chance of winning each of
the prizes. With our optimal prize profile, this amounts to the rule that an agent with
lowest effort receives the low prize, except if all agents have reached a prespecified per-
formance threshold (the cap), in which case the low prize is allocated randomly. Second,
an even simpler implementation is to put an actual upper bound on the effort that each
agent can provide, e.g. by enforcing maximal work hours, limiting the accumulation of
overtime, or imposing page limits and deadlines on grant proposals. This can often be
done even though the principal cannot observe or control the actual effort. For exam-
ple, by limiting the work day to 8 hours, the principal imposes an upper bound on the
maximal effort by limiting the opportunities to exert effort. Making sure that an agent
actually exerts effort during those 8 hours is a much more difficult problem. Hence,
while imposing upper bounds on effort is often feasible, enforcing lower bounds is typ-
ically not possible. See Gavious et al. (2002) for many other examples of actual caps that
are imposed in different contests.
The following result shows that a cap at the optimal effort level e∗ generates a unique
equilibrium in the all-pay auction, which is in pure strategies.
Theorem 3. The all-pay auction with prize profile y = (x∗/(n−1)     x∗/(n−1)0) and
a cap at e∗ uniquely implements the effort profile (e∗     e∗).
22Uniqueness, as defined here, refers to the agents’ choice of efforts in the given contest. The reviewer
will always be indifferent among several actions, by Lemma 1. In particular, a “babbling” equilibrium exists
in any credible contract. In such an equilibrium, the reviewer’s report is uninformative about the agents’
efforts and they exert zero effort. Hence, our notion of uniqueness is the strongest possible in this setting.
492 Letina, Liu, and Netzer Theoretical Economics 15 (2020)
To see why all agents exerting e∗ is an equilibrium, observe that upward deviations
are ineffective (or impossible) while downward deviations guarantee the zero prize. The
intuition for the result that no other pure-strategy equilibria exist is similar to that for
all-pay auctions without caps: For every effort profile e = (e∗     e∗), either an upward
deviation discretely increases the probability of winning, or a downward deviation de-
creases costs without changing the probability of winning. The last step in the proof is
to show that the cap destroys any potential mixed-strategy equilibrium. Note that the
all-pay auction without a cap does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. There-
fore, the max–min optimal ranking mechanism in Frankel (2014) would not be optimal
in our setting with endogenous efforts, because it is unable to implement the optimal
effort profile.
An existing literature has investigated the effect of caps on equilibria and revenues
in all-pay auctions (see Che and Gale 1998 for an early contribution and Olszewski and
Siegel 2019 for a very general recent treatment). In particular, it is known that caps can
generate pure-strategy equilibria. In our setting, e∗ is the largest possible cap for which
a pure-strategy equilibrium still exists. This is intuitive. The principal wants to make the
contest as competitive as possible without destroying the pure-strategy equilibrium.
The all-pay auction with a cap is not the only contest success function that imple-
ments the optimum. It can be shown that a suitably defined Tullock contest is also able
to implement the optimal effort profile.23 This provides a novel foundation for the im-
perfectly discriminating Tullock contest success function. The noise in the prize allo-
cation is explicitly generated within the optimal contract, rather than being the result
of uncontrolled factors in the allocation process. Combined with the above Theorem 3,
this also shows that the essential feature of our main result is the fixed profile of prizes,
and not the exact way in which these prizes are awarded to the agents.
4. Delegation mechanisms
In our motivating example of performance pay within firms, the mid-level supervisor is
often not asked to report to the principal but can himself determine which subordinate
should get a bonus. That is, the principal delegates the choice of the agents’ compensa-
tion to the reviewer. The classical delegation literature studies the design of a delegation
set of actions that the principal makes available to the person who takes the final deci-
sion.
In our context, a delegation set is a setD⊆ T of (potentially stochastic) payments to
the agents, from which the reviewer is free to choose. From our mechanism design per-
spective, a delegation set is just an indirect mechanism that must yield the same equi-
librium outcome as some direct mechanism. Conversely, given an incentive-compatible
direct mechanism, i.e., a credible contract , a natural delegation set to consider is
D = {μ ∈ T | ∃(eθ) s.t. μ= μeθ}
If the principal makes the actions in D available to the reviewer, then the (IC-R) con-
straint implies that a reviewer of any type θ finds it optimal to choose μeθ from D when
23Details are available upon request.
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he observes any effort profile e.24 Hence, the delegation set D can be used to replicate
the outcome of the direct mechanism .
The delegation set D is the smallest but generally not the only set that can be used
to replicate the outcome of . It is possible to add additional actions which the reviewer
never finds strictly more attractive than the action μeθ that he is supposed to take. This
is of particular interest when we consider the replication of a contest Cy by means of
a delegation set. The smallest delegation set DCy , as defined above, does generally not
include all possible random allocations of the prize profile y, only those that the specific
contest success function prescribes for some effort profile e. For instance, an all-pay
auction prescribes only deterministic allocations or uniform randomization in case of
ties. A larger and more natural delegation set is the set
Dy = {μ ∈ T | μ(P(y))= 1}
of all possible random allocations of the prize profile y. This literally reflects the idea
that the reviewer is constrained only by the prizes but not in how he distributes them. It
follows immediately from Lemma 2 that Dy can be used as a delegation set for any con-
test Cy , because all random allocations of y generate the same payoffs for the principal
and the same sum of utilities for the agents.
Given that our optimal prize structure has n − 1 identical prizes, one can contem-
plate an even larger delegation set which forces the reviewer to pay zero to one agent
but gives him freedom to allocate x∗ arbitrarily among the remaining agents. Any re-
viewer with θ ≥ 0 would find it optimal to hand out n − 1 equal shares. Hence, if θ ≥ 0
is guaranteed, this larger delegation set is another indirect replication of the optimal
contest.25
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed a three-tiered structure consisting of a principal, a reviewer, and n
agents. The principal designs a reward scheme to induce the agents to exert effort. How-
ever, the principal does not observe the efforts, so she relies on the reviewer to evaluate
the agents’ performance. The reviewer has private information about the utility weights
he puts on the payoffs of the principal and the agents. Our main result is that a simple
mechanism, a contest, is optimal. By providing commitment for a lenient reviewer to
punish shirking agents, a contest efficiently incentivizes the agents to exert costly effort.
24Formally, constraints (IC-R) and (IC-A) characterize perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following game.
Given the delegation set D, the agents simultaneously choose their efforts e. Nature then determines the
reviewer’s type θ. The reviewer finally observes e and θ and selects an action from D. Constraint (IC-
R) prescribes sequential rationality for the reviewer’s (singleton) information sets, while (IC-A) prescribes
sequential rationality (with weakly consistent beliefs) for the information sets in which the agents choose.
25The larger set no longer works if θ < 0 is possible, in which case the reviewer would find it optimal
to pay x∗ to a single agent regardless of actual performance. There is not much scope for giving more
discretion to the reviewer than Dy if the delegation set is required to work for all possible reviewer type
distributions. It is straightforward to show that we can only add stochastic transfers to Dy which generate
the same expected sum of utilities of the agents as y and have an expected sum weakly larger than x∗.
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As we have shown in an earlier working paper version (Letina et al. 2018), our results
are robust in a range of extensions. First, the assumption that the reviewer perfectly ob-
serves the effort of each agent can be relaxed. As long as effort observation is not too
incomplete or too noisy, the principal will still be able and find it optimal to implement
the second-best effort from the noiseless environment, using the same optimal prize
profile but adjusting the contest success function. Second, our optimal contest can re-
main effective with more general preferences of the reviewer. For instance, the reviewer
may have concerns for fairness, resulting in a desire to give larger prizes to agents who
have exerted higher efforts. This creates no fundamental problems for our all-pay auc-
tion with a cap, which is (almost) perfectly discriminating. A more challenging problem
is favoritism. The reviewer will not be indifferent between all prize permutations if he
prefers some agents over others. To address this problem, the principal could structure
the observation process such that the chosen efforts are observable but not the identity
of the agent who chose each effort. This is commonly referred to as a blind review-
ing process and is indeed used for performance evaluation (e.g., see Goldin and Rouse
2000). Even if blind reviews are impossible, a contest may still outperform alternative
contracts, because it restricts the scope of favoritism more than, e.g., a bonus pool con-
tract. Finally, our model can be generalized to incorporate heterogeneous abilities of the
agents. A loser-gets-nothing contest remains optimal if there are only two agents, or if
the heterogeneity in the agents’ abilities is not too large.26
Of course, contests are not flawless mechanisms. Our model ignores three potential
drawbacks: sabotage, collusion, and inequality concerns. First, since winning a contest
requires outperforming the competitors, an agent may try to sabotage the effort of his
competitors instead of exerting productive effort.27 Whether this is an issue will depend
on how difficult it is to sabotage the competitors, and how well the reviewer can observe
attempts at sabotage. In our setting, it is credible to assign the zero prize whenever any
sabotage attempt is observed. Hence, if sabotage is observable with a sufficiently high
probability, it can be dealt with just like deviations from the optimal effort profile. In
other cases, sabotage will limit the extent to which a contest can be used in practice.
Second, collusion is an attractive option for contestants.28 In our all-pay auction
with a cap, collusion on an effort level lower than the cap may be fragile, because a
marginal increase in effort would guarantee the deviator a positive prize. Furthermore,
as Bandiera et al. (2005) point out, the ability of coworkers to monitor each other’s out-
put is necessary for collusion. Whether collusion can arise in a contest will therefore
again depend on the specific application. It is important to note that contest mecha-
nisms are not unique in their susceptibility to collusion. Laffont and Martimort (1997,
26With an arbitrary number of agents and arbitrary heterogeneity in effort costs, a generalized contest is
always optimal. Such a contest is described by two prize profiles y and yd , where the prizes y are allocated in
equilibrium and the prizes yd are allocated after deviations. In general, the prize profile used in equilibrium
may feature more than two prize levels.
27Berger et al. (2013) find that, when given the opportunity, subjects in their laboratory experiment do
indeed engage in some sabotage.
28Using personnel data from a large UK farm, Bandiera et al. (2005) show that workers paid under a
relative incentive scheme do collude. Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) consider collusion between workers
and the supervisor and show how it can reduce incentives for agents to exert effort.
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1998) argue convincingly that collusion is an issue in a standard mechanism design
problem with hidden information. In addition to agents colluding among themselves,
agents could also collude with the supervisor, as in Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003). Inter-
estingly, both Laffont and Martimort (1998) and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) find that
delegation to the supervisor can be a response to the possibility of collusion. An ad-
ditional way to mitigate the danger of collusion, suggested by Laffont and Martimort
(1999), is to introduce multiple supervisors.
Finally, a contest generates ex post inequality even when all agents have exerted the
expected level of effort, which can be perceived as unfair and can generate additional
welfare losses (on top of the welfare loss from ex ante uncertainty). While some inequal-
ity is necessary to sustain incentives in our setting, the loser-gets-nothing contest gener-
ates a particular type of inequality. Inequality concerns may put additional constraints
on the prize profile that can be used in practice.
Despite these potential drawbacks, contests are widely used in reality. Understand-
ing precisely when the benefits of contests outweigh their shortcomings is a promising
area for future research.
Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1 If-statement. We first show that (IC-R) is implied by (i)–(iii).
Note that (IC-R) can be rewritten as
S(eθ)− S(e′ θ′)≥ (θ− θ′)Su(e′ θ′) ∀(eθ) (e′ θ′) ∈ E ×	
Using (i) and (iii), this is equivalent to the requirement that, ∀e′ ∈E and ∀θθ′ ∈	,∫ θ
θ′
(
Su
(
e′ s
)− Su(e′ θ′))ds ≥ 0
and this inequality indeed holds since Su(e′ θ) is nondecreasing in θ by (ii).
Only-if-statement. We now proceed to prove that (IC-R) implies (i)–(iii). Note that
for the special case θ′ = θ, (IC-R) is reduced to the requirement that S(eθ) ≥ S(e′ θ)
∀e e′ ∈ E. Interchanging e and e′, we immediately obtain (i). Next, consider the special
case where e′ = e. For this case, (IC-R) requires that, ∀θθ′ ∈	,
S(eθ)≥ −St
(
eθ′
)+ θSu(eθ′) (ICθθ′)
and
S
(
eθ′
)≥ −St(eθ)+ θ′Su(eθ) (ICθ′θ)
Summing up (ICθθ′) and (ICθ′θ) we obtain(
θ− θ′)(Su(eθ)− Su(eθ′))≥ 0 ∀θθ′ ∈	
Thus, Su(eθ) must be nondecreasing in θ, which is condition (ii). The envelope for-
mula in (iii) follows directly from Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002), where abso-
lute continuity of S(eθ) holds because the set of transfer profiles is bounded.
496 Letina, Liu, and Netzer Theoretical Economics 15 (2020)
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2 By Lemma 1, credibility implies that, ∀e e′ ∈E and ∀θ ∈	,
δ
(
e e′ θ
)= S(eθ)− S(e′ θ)= ∫ θ
θ
(
Su(e s)− Su
(
e′ s
))
ds = 0
This implies that, for any fixed e e′ ∈E, Su(eθ)= Su(e′ θ) for almost every θ ∈	. It then
also immediately follows that St(eθ) = St(e′ θ) for almost every θ ∈ 	. Now choose an
arbitrary e′ ∈E and define the functions x and xˆ by
x(θ)= St
(
e′ θ
)
 xˆ(θ)= Su
(
e′ θ
) ∀θ ∈	
It follows that, for any e ∈E, St(eθ)= x(θ) and Su(eθ)= xˆ(θ) for almost all θ ∈	.
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose  = (μeθ)(eθ)∈E×	 implements σ . In particular, 
is credible, so by Lemma 2 there exists a pair of function x and xˆ such that, ∀e ∈E,
Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x(θ) Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ(θ)
for almost every θ ∈	. Since  implements σ , we also have ∀i ∈ I and ∀σ ′i ∈ R+,
Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
u(ti)
]]− c(ei)]≥ E(σ ′i σ−i)[Eτ[Eμeθ[u(ti)]]− c(ei)]
The expected payoff of the principal with (σ) is given by
P(σ)= Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei −Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]
= Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
−Eτ
[
x(θ)
]

For every e ∈ E, define a probability measure μe ∈ T such that
μe(A)= Eτ
[
μeθ(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T .29 Now construct an alternative contract ˆ by setting
μˆeθ = μe for all (eθ) ∈ E × 	. This contract satisfies the property of θ-independence
stated in the lemma. Since, ∀(eθ) ∈E ×	,
Sˆt(eθ)= Eμˆeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eμe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eτ
[
x(θ)
]

Sˆu(eθ)= Eμˆeθ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eμe
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]]
= Eτ
[
xˆ(θ)
]

by Lemma 1 it is straightforward to check that ˆ is credible. Furthermore, note that
i
(
σ ′ ˆ
)= Eσ ′[Eτ[Eμˆeθ[u(ti)]]− c(ei)]
29The assumption discussed in footnote 16 ensures that the expectation (as well as the ones in the proof
of the next lemma) is well-defined. It is also easy to show that μe is indeed a probability measure.
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= Eσ ′
[
Eτ
[
Eμe
[
u(ti)
]]− c(ei)]
= Eσ ′
[
Eτ
[
Eμeθ
[
u(ti)
]]− c(ei)]
=i
(
σ ′
)
for all σ ′ and i ∈ I, which implies that ˆ implements σ because  implements σ .
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is Eσ [∑ni=1 ei] −Eτ[x(θ)] with both (σ) and (σ ˆ).
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose  = (μe)e∈E implements σ . We first construct a
probability measure η ∈ T by
η(A)= Eσ
[
μe(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A⊆ T . Furthermore, for each i ∈ I we construct a probability
measure η(i) ∈ T by setting
η(i)(A)= Eσ
[
μ(0e−i)(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A⊆ T . We now construct an alternative contract ˆ= (μˆe)e∈E
as follows. For e= e¯, we let μˆe = η. For any e= (ei e¯−i) with ei = e¯i, we let μˆe = η(i). For
all remaining e, we let μˆe = μe.
We first show that ˆ is credible. Since  is credible and its transfers are independent
of θ, by Lemma 2 there exist x xˆ ∈R+ such that Eμe[∑ni=1 ti] = x and Eμe[∑ni=1 u(ti)] = xˆ
for all e ∈E. First consider μˆe for e= e¯. We obtain
Eμˆe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
Eμe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ [x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, Eμˆe¯[
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Now consider μˆe for e = (ei e¯−i)
with ei = e¯i. We obtain
Eμˆ(eie¯−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη(i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
E
μ(0e−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ [x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, Eμˆ(eie¯−i)[
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Since ˆ and  are identical
for all other e, we can conclude that Eμˆe[
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eμˆe[
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈E.
It is then straightforward to check that ˆ is credible by using Lemma 1.
We next show that, in ˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play e¯i when the
remaining agents are playing e¯−i, which implies that ˆ implements e¯. This claim holds
because, ∀i ∈ I and ∀e′i = e¯i,
i(e¯ ˆ)= Eη
[
u(ti)
]− c(e¯i)
= Eσ
[
Eμe
[
u(ti)
]]− c(Eσ [ei])
≥ Eσ
[
Eμe
[
u(ti)
]]−Eσ[c(ei)]
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≥ Eσ
[
E
μ(0e−i)
[
u(ti)
]]
≥ Eσ
[
E
μ(0e−i)
[
u(ti)
]]− c(e′i)
= Eη(i)
[
u(ti)
]− c(e′i)=i((e′i e¯−i) ˆ) (1)
where the first inequality follows the convexity of c and the second inequality follows
from the fact that  implements σ .
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (σ) and (e¯ ˆ).
A.1.5 Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose = (μe)e∈E implements e¯. We now construct an al-
ternative contract ˆ= (μˆe)e∈E as follows. For e= eˆ, we define μˆe by generating a profile
of prizes t = (t1     tn) according to μe¯ and then allocating these prizes randomly and
uniformly among the agents. For any e = (ei eˆ−i) with ei = eˆi, we let μˆe by given as fol-
lows. A number j is drawn uniformly from I and then a profile of prizes t = (t1     tn) is
generated according to μ(0e¯−j). The deviating agent i gets the prize tj and the remaining
n−1 prizes are allocated randomly and uniformly among the nondeviating agents. Note
that, by construction, this punishment rule for unilateral deviations does not depend on
the identity of the agent being punished. For all remaining e, we let μˆe = μe.
We first show that ˆ is credible. By Lemma 2, credibility and θ-independence of 
imply that there exists x xˆ ∈R+ such that Eμe[∑ni=1 ti] = x and Eμe[∑ni=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all
e ∈ E. Now first consider μˆe for e= eˆ. We obtain
Eμˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eμe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x
Eμˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eμe¯
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ
Now consider μˆe for any e= (ei eˆ−i) with ei = eˆi. We obtain
E
μˆ(eieˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
μ
(0e¯−j )
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
x= x
E
μˆ(eieˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
μ
(0e¯−j )
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
xˆ= xˆ
Since ˆ and  are identical for all other e, we can conclude that Eμˆe[
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and
Eμˆe[
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E. It is then straightforward to check that ˆ is credible by
using Lemma 1.
We next show that, in ˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play eˆi when
the remaining agents are playing eˆ−i, which implies that ˆ implements eˆ. To prove this
claim, note that
Eμe¯
[
u(ti)
]− c(e¯i)≥ Eμ(0e¯−i)[u(ti)]
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holds for all i ∈ I because  implements e¯. Summing over all i ∈ I and dividing by n
yields
Eμe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k)≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
μ(0e¯−k)
[
u(tk)
]

We now obtain, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei = eˆi,
i(eˆ ˆ)= Eμˆeˆ
[
u(ti)
]− c(eˆi)
= Eμe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eμe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k)
≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
μ(0e¯−k)
[
u(tk)
]− c(ei)
= E
μˆ(eieˆ−i)
[
u(ti)
]− c(ei)=i((ei eˆ−i) ˆ)
where the first inequality follows from convexity of c. Hence the claim follows.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (e¯) and (eˆ ˆ).
A.1.6 Proof of Lemma 6 Suppose  = (μe)e∈E implements the symmetric profile eˆ.
From the proof of Lemma 5 we know that it is without loss of generality to assume that
 has the following form. If e= eˆ, a profile of prizes t = (t1     tn) is generated according
to some probability measure π and these prizes are randomly and uniformly allocated
to the agents. If e= (ei eˆ−i) with ei = eˆi for some i ∈ I, a profile of prizes td = (td1      tdn )
is generated according to some (i-independent) probability measure ρ and agent i gets
tdn , while the remaining n − 1 prizes are randomly and uniformly allocated among the
other agents. For all other effort profiles e, the transfer rule can be chosen as for eˆ. Thus,
we have
Eμeˆ
[
u(ti)
]= Eπ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
 E
μ(eieˆ−i)
[
u(ti)
]= Eρ[u(tdn )]
Furthermore, by Lemma 2, credibility and θ-independence of  imply that there exist
x xˆ ∈R+ such that Eμe[∑ni=1 ti] = x and Eμe[∑ni=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈E.
Now construct a contest Cy with prize profile y as follows. Define td as the certainty
equivalent of a deviating agent’s random transfers in contract , i.e., u(td) = Eρ[u(tdn )].
Note that td ≤ Eρ[tdn ] by concavity of u. Then define the prize profile
y =
(
x− td
n− 1     
x− td
n− 1  t
d
)

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The allocation rule of Cy is as follows. If e = eˆ, the prizes are randomly and uniformly
allocated among all agents. If e= (ei eˆ−i) with ei = eˆi for some i ∈ I, the deviating agent
i obtains td and all other agents obtain (x− td)/(n− 1). For all other effort profiles e, the
prizes are again randomly and uniformly allocated among all agents.
Since Cy is a contest, it is credible. Furthermore, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei = eˆi,
i(eˆCy)=
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
x− td
n− 1
)
+ 1
n
u
(
td
)− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(Eρ
[
n∑
k=1
tdk
)]
−Eρ
[
tdn )
]
n− 1 )+
1
n
Eρ
[
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
=
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1 t
d
k
])
+ 1
n
Eρ
[
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
u
(
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1 t
d
k
)]
+ 1
n
Eρ
[
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1u
(
tdk
)]+ 1
n
Eρ
[
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n−1∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]+Eρ
[
1
n
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]− c(eˆi)
= Eπ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eρ
[
u
(
tdn
)]− c(ei)
= u(td)− c(ei)=i((ei eˆ−i)Cy)
where the first inequality follows from td ≤ Eρ[tdn ], the second and third inequalities fol-
low from concavity of u, and the last inequality follows from the fact that  implements
eˆ. We can thus conclude that Cy also implements eˆ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 eˆi − x with both (eˆ) and (eˆCy).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Only-if-statement. Suppose (σ∗C∗y ) solves (P). We first claim that σ∗ must be a pure-
strategy effort profile. By contradiction, suppose there exists j ∈ I such that σ∗j is not a
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Dirac measure. We can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4 to construct a
contract ˆ (in fact, a contest) that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯. The only dif-
ference to the proof of Lemma 4 is that we let e¯j = Eσ∗j [ej] +  for some  > 0 (but still
e¯i = Eσ∗i [ei] for all i = j). Credibility of ˆ and the fact that e¯i is a best response to e¯−i for
all i = j follow exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4. Since c is strictly convex and σ∗j is not
a Dirac measure, the first inequality in (1) is strict for j when  = 0. It then follows that
e¯j is a best response to e¯−j for sufficiently small  > 0. Since the principal’s payoff with
(e¯ ˆ) is increased by , (σ∗C∗y ) cannot have been a solution to (P).
Now suppose (e¯C∗y ) solves (P), where e¯ may still be asymmetric. Denote x =∑n
k=1 yk. We next show that whenever yn > 0, there exists another contest Cy˜ with∑n
k=1 y˜k = x that implements an effort profile e˜ with
∑n
i=1 e˜i >
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and hence (e¯C∗y )
cannot have been a solution to (P). Denote by pki (e) the probability that agent i receives
prize yk in C∗y when the effort profile is e. Note that
i
(
e¯C∗y
)= n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i)≥
n∑
k=1
pki (0 e¯−i)u(yk)≥ u(yn)
because C∗y implements e¯. Now consider an agent j ∈ I for which pnj (e¯) < 1. Construct
a contest Cy˜ with a profile of prizes y˜ given by y˜1 = y1 + δ, y˜n = yn − δ, and y˜k = yk for
all k = 1 n, where δ ∈ (0 yn]. Note that ∑nk=1 y˜k = x. Let effort profile e˜ be such that
e˜j = e¯j +  and e˜i = e¯i for all i = j, where  > 0. Note that ∑ni=1 e˜i >∑ni=1 e¯i. The rule of
contest Cy˜ is the following. If the effort profile is e˜, then the prizes y˜ are allocated such
that each agent i receives prize y˜k with probability p˜ki (e˜)= pki (e¯). If some agent i unilat-
erally deviates from e˜, then agent i receives the prize y˜n, while the prizes y˜1     y˜n−1 are
allocated randomly and uniformly among the remaining agents. Otherwise, the alloca-
tion of prizes can be chosen arbitrarily. For sufficiently small  > 0 we then have, ∀i ∈ I
and ∀ei ∈R+,
i(e˜Cy˜)=
n∑
k=1
p˜ki (e˜)u(y˜k)− c(e˜i)
=i
(
e¯C∗y
)+p1i (e¯)(u(y1 + δ)− u(y1))
+pni (e¯)
(
u(yn − δ)− u(yn)
)+ c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn)+p1i (e¯)
(
u(y1 + δ)− u(y1)
)
+pni (e¯)
(
u(yn − δ)− u(yn)
)+ c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn − δ)= u(y˜n)≥i
(
(ei e˜−i)Cy˜
)

where the second inequality holds because
u(yn)+pni (e¯)
(
u(yn − δ)− u(yn)
)≥ u(yn − δ)
for all i ∈ I, with strict inequality for j. Hence Cy˜ implements e˜.
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When studying the set of all contest solutions to (P), we thus need to consider only
pure-strategy effort profiles e¯ and contests Cy with yn = 0. Fix a sum of prizes x ∈ [0 T¯ ].
Let ex be the (unique) effort level that solves
n− 1
n
u
(
x
n− 1
)
− c(ex)= 0
Note that, by the assumptions on u and c, the solution ex is differentiable, strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave in x. We now claim that nex is an upper bound on the sum
of efforts implementable with a contest Cy that has
∑n
k=1 yk = x and yn = 0, and it can
be reached only by implementing the symmetric effort profile (ex     ex). Suppose first
that Cy implements an effort profile e¯ with
∑n
i=1 e¯i ≥ nex but e¯ = (ex     ex). Note that
i(e¯Cy)=
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i)≥ u(yn)− c(0)= 0
because Cy implements e¯. Summing these inequalities over all agents we obtain
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i)=
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i)≥ 0
However, due to weak concavity of u and strict convexity of c we also have
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) < (n− 1)u
(
x
n− 1
)
− nc(ex)= 0
a contradiction. Observe next that (ex     ex) can indeed be implemented. For in-
stance, let y = (x/(n − 1)     x/(n − 1)0) and choose the rules of Cy as follows. If the
effort profile is (ex     ex), then the prizes are allocated randomly and uniformly across
the agents. If some agent i unilaterally deviates from (ex     ex), then agent i receives
the prize 0, while each other agent receives x/(n− 1). Otherwise, the allocation of prizes
can be chosen arbitrarily. It follows immediately from the definition of ex that this con-
test indeed implements (ex     ex).
Given any sum of prizes x, the highest payoff that the principal can achieve is thus
given by P(x)= nex−x, and the problem is reduced to a choice of x ∈ [0 T¯ ]. Since P is
continuous in x, it follows that a solution exists. Furthermore, since P is differentiable
and strictly concave, the first-order condition ∂P/∂x= 0 that is stated in part (i) of the
theorem uniquely characterizes a value x¯ > 0 (given the assumptions on u and c), and
the optimal value of x is given by x∗ = min{x¯ T¯ }. The resulting implemented optimal
effort level is then given by e∗ = ex∗ .
We complete the proof of the only-if-statement by showing that any optimal con-
test has the profile of prizes y = (x∗/(n − 1)     x∗/(n − 1)0) whenever u is strictly
concave. By contradiction, let Cy be a contest that implements (e∗     e∗) with∑n
k=1 yk = x∗ and yn = 0 but y1 = yn−1. Proceeding as before, summing the inequalities
i((e
∗     e∗)Cy) ≥ 0 over all agents yields ∑n−1k=1 u(yk) − nc(e∗) ≥ 0. Strict concavity
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of u, however, implies that
∑n−1
k=1 u(yk) − nc(e∗) < (n − 1)u(x∗/(n − 1)) − nc(e∗) = 0, a
contradiction.
If-statement. We showed above that the upper bound on the principal’s payoff is
given by ne∗ − x∗. Thus, any contest which implements (e∗     e∗) with the prize sum
x∗ attains the upper bound.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Each optimal contest induces individual efforts of e∗ and pays a sum of x∗, as charac-
terized in Theorem 2. Now consider the principal’s first-best problem. If the agents’
efforts were directly observable and verifiable, then the principal could ask for individ-
ual efforts of e and would have to compensate the agents with a transfer sum x such
that u(x/n)− c(e)= 0. Put differently, for a given transfer sum x the maximal achievable
individual effort is
ex = c−1
(
u
(
x
n
))

and the first-best problem is to maximize nex − x by choice of x ∈ [0 T¯ ]. With the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, this yields xFB =min{x˜ T¯ }, where x˜ is given by
u′
(
x˜
n
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
u
(
x˜
n
)))

The resulting optimal effort level is
eFB = c−1
(
u
(
xFB
n
))

Now suppose that the agents are risk-neutral, i.e., the function u is linear. The conditions
characterizing (e∗x∗) in Theorem 2 then coincide with those characterizing (eFBxFB)
above, which implies (e∗x∗)= (eFBxFB). Then suppose that the agents are risk-averse,
i.e., the function u is strictly concave. If x∗ = xFB there is nothing to prove. Hence assume
x∗ = xFB. Inspection of the conditions that define e∗ and eFB then immediately reveals
that e∗ < eFB.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1 shows that (e∗     e∗) is an equilibrium of
the contest C∗y described in the theorem. Step 2 shows that no other equilibria exist.
The structure of the arguments in Step 2 is reminiscent of equilibrium characterization
proofs in all-pay auctions with or without caps (e.g. Baye et al. 1996 or Che and Gale
1998). Throughout the proof, we adopt the interpretation of a nonphysical cap, so ef-
forts ei > e∗ are possible but are not differentiated by the reviewer. The result then also
follows for the case where e∗ is a physical bound on efforts.
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Step 1. Consider deviations e′i of agent i from (e
∗     e∗). If e′i > e
∗, we obtain
i
((
e∗     e∗
)
C∗y
)= n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
>
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i)
=i
((
e∗     e′i     e
∗)C∗y )
If e′i < e
∗, we obtain
i
((
e∗     e∗
)
C∗y
)= n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
= 0≥ −c(e′i)=i((e∗     e′i     e∗)C∗y )
Thus, the contest C∗y implements the effort profile (e∗     e∗).
Step 2. By contradiction, suppose C∗y also implements some other profile σ =
(e∗     e∗). Denote the support of σi by Li, so ei ∈ Li if and only if every open neigh-
bourhood N of ei satisfies σi(N) > 0. We first show that it must be that Li ⊆ [0 e∗] for
all i ∈ I. Suppose not, so there exists an agent i and an effort level ei > e∗ such that
σi((ei −  ei + )) > 0 ∀ > 0. Fix ¯ > 0 such that ei − ¯ > e∗. Note that the expected
payoff of agent i playing e′i ≥ e∗ with probability one, while the other agents play σ−i, is
i
(
e′iσ−i
)= [1−∏
j =i
σj
([e∗∞))+∏
j =i
σj
([e∗∞))n− 1
n
]
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i)
where we omit the dependence on C∗y to simplify notation. Since c is strictly increasing,
we have i(e∗σ−i) > i(e′iσ−i) for all e
′
i > e
∗. Hence i(e∗σ−i) > i(e¯iσ−i) for all
e¯i ∈ (ei− ¯ ei+ ¯). Sinceσi((ei− ¯ ei+ ¯)) > 0, agent i could strictly increase his expected
payoff by shifting the mass from this interval to e∗. Thus, σ is not an equilibrium. From
now on, we only consider the cases where Li ⊆ [0 e∗] ∀i ∈ I. Let ei = minLi. Since the
proposed profile σ is different from (e∗     e∗), it must be that e=mini∈I ei < e∗.
First, suppose that e > 0. Furthermore suppose that σj({e}) > 0 for exactly one agent
j ∈ I, or that σi({e})= 0 for all i ∈ I. In the latter case let j be such that ej = e. Then there
exists some ¯ > 0 such that
j(e+ σ−j)≤
[
1−
∏
i =j
σi
(
(e+ ∞))]u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ ) < 0
for all  < ¯. Intuitively, the probability that agent j wins a positive prize approaches
zero as  approaches zero (by right continuity of σi((e+ ∞)) in  and σi((e∞))= 1),
while the cost of effort at e is strictly positive. Hence agent j could strictly increase his
expected payoff by shifting the mass σj([e e+ ¯)) > 0 from [e e+ ¯) to 0. Next suppose
that σi({e}) > 0 for at least two agents i= jk. Then there exists a small  > 0 such that
j(eσ−j)≤
[
1−
(
1− 1
2
σk
({e})) ∏
i =jk
σi
(
(e∞))]u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e)
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<
[
1−
∏
i =j
σi
(
(e∞))]u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ )
≤j(e+ σ−j)
The intuition is that a small upward deviation from e increases the probability of win-
ning discretely, while marginally increasing the effort costs. Hence agent j could strictly
increase his expected payoff by shifting the mass σj({e}) > 0 from e to e+. We conclude
that there does not exist an equilibrium σ = (e∗     e∗) with e > 0.
Second, suppose that e = 0. Consider first the case where σi({0}) = 0 for all i ∈ I,
that is, no agent places an atom on 0. If there is an agent j such that ek > 0 for all k = j,
then there exists some ¯ > 0 such that j(σ−j) = −c() for all  < ¯. Agent j could
then strictly increase his expected payoff by shifting the mass σj((0 ¯)) > 0 from (0 ¯)
to 0. Thus, there have to be at least two agents j and k with ej = ek = 0. But in this case,
observe that
j(σ−j)≤
[(
1−
∏
i =j
σi
(
(∞)))u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
]
and
lim
→0
[(
1−
∏
i =j
σi
(
(∞)))u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
]
= 0
Thus for every ¯ > 0 there exists ¯ > 0 such that j(σ−j) < ¯ for all  < ¯. Intuitively,
both the probability of winning and the costs approach zero as → 0. However, it must
be that j(e∗σ−j) > 0 since j(e∗     e∗)= 0 and the probability that j wins a positive
prize is strictly greater if the other agents play σ−j , because at least agent k exerts efforts
lower than e∗ with strictly positive probability. Hence agent j could strictly increase his
expected payoff by shifting the mass σj((0 ¯)) > 0 from (0 ¯) to e∗, for some sufficiently
small ¯ > 0. The only remaining case is σj({0}) > 0 for at least one agent j ∈ I. Observe
that there can only be one such agent, since otherwise a small upward deviation from
0 would lead to a discrete increase in the probability of winning a positive prize, analo-
gous to the argument above. Then it must be that j(σjσ−j) = 0 since j(0σ−j) = 0.
This can only be the maximum payoff of agent j if all other agents exert deterministic
efforts equal to e∗, since otherwise j(e∗σ−j) > 0. In this case, agent j is indifferent be-
tween playing 0 or e∗, and all other effort levels yield strictly lower payoffs. This implies
σj({0})+ σj({e∗})= 1. Now consider an agent k = j. Observe that a deviation by agent k
to some  with 0< < e∗ leads to payoffs
k(σ−k)= σj
({0})u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
Thus a sufficiently small  > 0 will be a profitable deviation whenever
σj
({0})u( x∗
n− 1
)
>σj
({0})u( x∗
n− 1
)
+ (1− σj({0}))n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
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This can be reformulated to
0>−σj
({0})n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)

which always holds because σj({0}) > 0.
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